Mili brmaci!
Nasledujici prednaska mozna nebude prilis matematicka a mohla
by byt zajimava i pro lidi zajimajici se o "metody demokracie"
a volebni systemy.
----- Forwarded message from Martin Klazar <klazar(a)kam.mff.cuni.cz> -----
80. kolokvium
DON'T VOTE!: JUDGE
Michel L. Balinski
(Ecole Polytechnique)
patek 10. unora 2012 ve 14:00, poslucharna S5, druhe patro
KAM MFF UK
Malostranske nam. 25
118 00 Praha 1
Abstract
Voting mechanisms used throughout the world are in deep trouble.
People are slowly but surely becoming aware
that they do not work properly. The outputs---winners and
orders-of-finish of candidates---are not the true
choices of electorates.
Why? Voters' inputs do not permit an adequate expression of their
opinions. More fundamentally, the theory of voting
(or ``social choice'') has hypothesized an inadequate model that leads
to paradoxes and impossibility theorems
(notably, Arrow's). That model assumes that voters' inputs are
rank-orders of the candidates.
What can be done? It suffices to formulate a new model in which
voters' inputs are evaluations of candidates.
Instead of ranking candidates, or of naming one
(``first-past-the-post'') or several (``approval voting''), they are
given grades. A candidate's final grade---her majority-grade---is the
grade that a majority of the electorate
prefers to any other grade. The order-of-finish---the
majority-ranking---is determined by the candidates'
majority-grades.
This change in paradigm leads to a method---majority judgment---that
avoids the important traditional
paradoxes and impossibilities, elicits honest opinions, resists
manipulation, is meaningful in measurement,
and gives voters the right to truly express their opinions. It may be
characterized in several ways as the only
method that meets different subsets of these properties.
The method has been used and/or tested in various spheres: political
elections, judging wines, discerning an international
prize, ranking applicants for university positions, electing members
of the British Academy.
This talk will give an overview of the method and theory via concrete
examples.
Reference: Michel Balinski and Rida Laraki, Majority Judgment:
Measuring, Ranking, and Electing, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2010.
____________________________________________________________________________
Michel Balinski studoval v USA, MSc v oboru ekonomie ziskal na MIT v roce 1956
a doktorat v oboru matematika v Princetonu v roce
1959 (pod vedenim Johna Tukeyho), pracoval posleze na rade prednich
americkych universit a instituci (Princeton, Penn, CUNY,
Yale, SUNY Stony Brook, kde zalozil a vedl Institut for decision sciences).
Od roku 1980 zije prevazne ve Francii, kde pracoval
na Ecole Polytechnique jako reditel Ekonometricke laboratore. Za svou
praci ziskal radu oceneni vcetne Lancaster Prize
(OR Society) a Ford Prize (MAA). Byly mu udeleny dva cestne doktoraty
na universitach v Augsburgu a Yale.
V osobe prof. Balinskeho vitame jednu z klasickych osobnosti
matematickeho programovani, operacniho vyzkumu a ekonometie:
prof. Balinski je napriklad zakladajicim editorem casopisu
Mathematical Programming a byvalym presidentem Mathematical
Programming Society. Je autorem nekolika knih, vcetne nedavne
vyse zminene uspesne knihy s R. Laraki. Poslednich 40 let se
intenzivne zabyva
pouzitim matematickych metod pro reseni problemu vzniklych v
politickych souvislostech,
zejmena problematikou navrhu volebnich systemu. Teto oblasti se venuje
ve svem prazskem kolokviu.
----- End forwarded message -----
